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CLD-161        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3625 
___________ 
 
DAVID MEADE; CERAYSAH TIM, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL REYNOLDS, SUED IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY 
 
DAVID MEADE, 
          Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-05618) 
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 9, 2020 
 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed April 14, 2020) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
David Meade appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, dismissing his civil rights complaint for failure to 
effect service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).  For the following 
reasons, we will summarily affirm. 
Meade, along with Ceraysah Tim, commenced the underlying action by submitting 
a complaint to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 
October 2015.  The complaint asserted that Officer Michael Reynolds from “the 
Montgomery County Police Department” used excessive force when arresting Meade in 
Tim’s home on October 8, 2013.  The District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motions to 
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), filed the complaint, directed the Clerk to issue a 
summons, and instructed the U.S. Marshals Service to serve the summons and complaint 
upon Officer Reynolds.  The Marshals Service subsequently returned the summons 
unexecuted, noting that Officer Reynolds did not “work at Montco Sheriff” or at the 
“Montco P.D.”  On June 14, 2016, the District Court directed the plaintiffs to provide 
more specific information on Officer Reynolds, including an address where he could be 
served.  The plaintiffs failed to do so.  On August 1, 2016, the District Court ordered the 
plaintiffs to submit within 15 days an amended USM-285 form in accordance with the 
order of June 14, 2016, and advised that failure to comply would result in dismissal of the 
claims against Officer Reynolds pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).  The 
plaintiffs again failed to comply with the District Court’s order.  Accordingly, by order 
entered September 1, 2016, the District Court dismissed the action because the plaintiffs 
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failed to comply with Rule 4(m).1  In particular, the District Court stated that “[p]laintiffs 
still have not complied with the Court’s directive and [have] not shown good cause for 
their failure.” 
On September 12, 2016, Meade filed a motion to reopen the case, stating, “I 
fill[ed] out the U.S. Marshal Form 285 for Defendant Michael Reynolds in July, and I 
also did another one in May on a blank sheet of paper.”  While that motion was pending, 
Meade filed a notice of appeal.2  Thereafter, on November 1, 2019, the District Court 
issued an order providing Meade with an opportunity to demonstrate that he had 
submitted the forms referenced in his motion to reopen.3  Meade did not respond to that 
order.  Accordingly, by order entered December 9, 2019, the District Court denied the 
motion to reopen “with prejudice due to the failure of plaintiff to comply with this court’s 
November 1, 2019 order to demonstrate that he provided the United States Marshals 
Service with proper documentation to enable it to effect service of process under Rule 4 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 
 
1 The District Court did not specify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. 
 
2 Tim did not join Meade in the motion to reopen or in the notice of appeal. 
 
3 In particular, the District Court directed Meade to file “a copy of the Form 285 and/or 
the handwritten paper referenced in his” motion for reconsideration.  If Meade did not 
possess a copy of those documents, the District Court instructed him to file a statement, 
under penalty of perjury, declaring if he submitted the forms; providing how he submitted 
them, the date he submitted them, and the address where they were submitted; and noting 
the address for Officer Reynolds that he provided to the Marshals Service. 
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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.4  When a district court dismisses an 
action for lack of proper service, it “must dismiss the action without prejudice.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 4(m).  Without-prejudice dismissals typically are not immediately appealable, see 
Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), but we 
have held that an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 4 is final, and thus appealable, 
where expiration of the statute of limitations would preclude the appellant from refiling 
the complaint.  See Green v. Humphrey Elevator & Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 878 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 1987); Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 668 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding order of 
dismissal is final and appealable under § 1291 where complaint filed by a plaintiff 
granted leave to proceed IFP is dismissed without prejudice for failure to effect service of 
process).  Because Meade’s claims stem from an incident that occurred on October 8, 
2013, more than two years ago, those claims would now be time-barred.  See Lake v. 
Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that a two-year statute of limitations 
 
4   “As a general rule, the timely filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional 
significance, immediately conferring jurisdiction on a Court of Appeals and divesting a 
district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”  Venen 
v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1985).  But when a party timely files one of the 
motions listed in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A), the notice of appeal 
does not become effective until the district court disposes of that motion.  See Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i).  It makes no difference whether the Rule 4(a)(4)(A) motion is filed 
before or after the notice of appeal; all that matters is that the motion is timely.  See 
Venen, 758 F.2d at 122 n.6.  Meade filed a motion to reopen, which we construe as a 
timely motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b).  Because Rule 59(e) 
and Rule 60(b) motions are listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A), Meade’s notice of appeal did not 
become effective until the District Court denied his request for post-judgment relief.  And 
the notice of appeal from the denial of the timely filed post-judgment motion brings up 
for review the order dismissing the case for failure to comply with Rule 4(m). 
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applies to civil rights actions originating in Pennsylvania).  Thus, even if the September 
1, 2016 order is construed as dismissing Meade’s claims without prejudice under Rule 
4(m), appellate jurisdiction is nonetheless proper.  Our review of a dismissal pursuant to 
Rule 4(m), as well as dismissals of motions seeking relief under Rules 59(e) or 60(b), is 
for abuse of discretion.  See Ayres v. Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., 99 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 
1996) (Rule 4(m) motions); Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (Rule 
59(e) motions); Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003) (Rule 
60(b) motions).  
At the time that Meade filed the complaint, Rule 4(m) provided that a district court 
must dismiss a complaint after notice to the plaintiff if service of the complaint is not 
made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing.5  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).  A 
district court must extend the time for service, however, where a plaintiff demonstrates 
good cause for the failure to timely serve the defendant.  See McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of 
Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1998).  Even if a plaintiff fails to show good 
cause, the district court must still consider whether any additional factors warrant a 
discretionary extension of time.  See Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, GMHB, 46 
F.3d 1298, 1305-06 (3d Cir. 1995).   
A plaintiff proceeding IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is entitled to have the Marshals 
Service or other appointed person effect service.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 4(c)(3).  But the plaintiff must provide the district court with sufficient information to 
 
5 Effective December 1, 2015, Rule 4(m) was amended to require service of process 
within 90 days, rather than 120 days, of the filing of the complaint.    
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enable the Marshals Service to effectuate service of process.  See Lee v. Armontrout, 991 
F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that it is the responsibility of a plaintiff proceeding 
pro se and IFP to provide proper addresses for service).  Here, the Marshals Service 
attempted to locate Officer Reynolds at the address that the plaintiffs provided in the 
complaint.  But the Marshals Service’s attempt was unsuccessful, and it returned the 
USM-285 form unexecuted, noting that Officer Reynolds did not “work at Montco 
Sheriff” or at the “Montco P.D.”  The District Court provided two opportunities for the 
plaintiffs to furnish Officer Reynolds’ correct address, but they failed to do so.   
Under these circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that Meade had not shown good cause for an extension of the Rule 4(m) 
period.  The Marshals Service is not required to attempt service into perpetuity at the 
same address.  Moreover, Meade’s motion to reopen still did not contain the necessary 
information to effect service on Officer Reynolds.  The District Court nevertheless 
provided Meade with an additional opportunity to furnish Officer Reynolds’ address.  
Meade did not respond to that opportunity, which effectively operated as a discretionary 
extension of time.  See Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1305-06.  Accordingly, the denial of the 
motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion.   
   For the foregoing reasons, the appeal presents no substantial question.  
Therefore, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order of dismissal and its denial 
of Meade’s motion to reopen.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
